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Fighting For a Way of Life: Public Lands and the Ranchers 
Who Own Them - An Analysis of Colvin Cattle Co., v. United 
States, 468 F.3d 803 (2006) 
M. Benjamin Eichenberg*
We did not think of the great open plains, the beautiful 
rolling hills, and winding streams with tangled growth as 
“wild.”  Only to the white man was nature a “wilderness” 
and only to him was the land “infested” with “wild” animals 
and “savage” people.  To use it was tame.  Earth was 
bountiful and we were surrounded with the blessings of the 
Great Mystery.  Not until the hairy man from the east came 
with brutal frenzy heaped injustices upon us and the 
families we loved was it “wild” for us.  When the very 
animals of the forest began fleeing from his approach, then 
it was that for us the “Wild West” began.1 
I. Introduction
Prior to the arrival of Europeans to the Western United States, there 
were no local domesticable wild animals which native human populations 
could have used for food production.2  However, Native Americans quickly 
adopted European animals, and much of the modern conception of these 
* J.D. Candidate 2008, University of California Hastings College of the Law,
San Francisco, California.  Mr. Eichenberg will spend the 2008-09 academic year as a 
Fulbright Grantee in Norway, where he will study climate change regulation at the 
University of Oslo.  Mr. Eichenberg would like to thank Professors Brian Gray and 
John Leshy at U.C. Hastings, as well as Professor John D. Echeverria at Georgetown, 
for their generous assistance.  Additional thanks to Susie Meserve for her tireless 
copy editing, and to Tim Eichenberg. 
1. LUTHER STANDING BEAR, LAND OF THE SPOTTED EAGLE 38 (University of Nebraska
Press 1978) (1933). 
2. JARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL: THE FATES OF HUMAN SOCIETIES 356
(1999). 
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peoples revolves around their mastery of horse, cow, and sheep.3  These 
imported animals and the way of life they engendered became culturally 
identified with the peoples of the Western United States, both native and 
immigrant, and these animals are now inextricably linked to the nostalgic 
popular conception of the West. 
A unique chapter of the American West's storied history involves the 
range wars fought on the land, in the movies, and through the courts.  At 
stake was ownership of the range: vast tracks of land with a spirit strong 
enough to inspire a national identity.  Since the inception of cattle grazing in 
the West, ranchers have sought to establish private property interests in 
federal grazing permits as a way to check growing federal regulation of 
their livelihood,4 exemplified by passage of the Taylor Grazing Act (TGA) in 
19345 and the Federal Land Policy Management Act (FLPMA) in 1976.6  
Friction between cattlemen and the government resulted in the County 
Supremacy movement in the 1950s and in the Sagebrush Rebellion at the 
end of the 1970s.7 
In this decade, a series of court battles has encapsulated this conflict. 
In Colvin Cattle Co., Inc. v. United States, 468 F.3d 803 (2006) ("Colvin Cattle") the 
federal judiciary has slammed shut the door to private property rights first 
opened a crack in the Hage v. United States series of cases.8  At the end of the 
day, Colvin Cattle will stand for the primacy of federal law on federal land and 
the futility of seeking an individual private property interest in land owned in 
common by all the people of the United States (U.S.). 
Cattle grazing comprises by far the most land intensive and resource 
extractive use of federal lands in the United States.  Livestock grazing takes 
place on more than a quarter of a billion acres, a land mass more than twice 
the size of California.9  The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) manages the 
3. Id.
4. Debra L. Donahue, Western Grazing: the Capture of Grass, Ground, and Government,
35 ENVTL. L. 721 (2005) (exploring the federal grazing system in the West and its 
relationship to the legal rule of capture relating to property rights, the capture of 
government agencies by special interest groups, and the capture of American social 
consciousness by the myth of the cowboy). 
5. Taylor Grazing Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-316 (2000).
6. Federal Land Policy Management Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 (2000).
7. GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS, CHARLES F. WILKINSON, & JOHN D. LESHY, FEDERAL 
PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 777 (5th ed. 2002). 
8. Hage v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 570, 580 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 2002) (Hage III); Hage v.
United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 249 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 1998) (Hage II); Hage v. United States, 35 Fed. 
Cl. 147, 171 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 1996) (Hage I). 
9. The acreage of federal land used by livestock grazing is enormous, but the
meat produced from this acreage is almost inconsequential — roughly 2 percent of 
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lion's share of that land, about one hundred fifty eight million acres, almost 
all of which is concentrated in the eleven western states.10  In total, roughly 
nineteen thousand ranchers and farmers hold federal grazing permits issued 
by the BLM.11  These ranchers and farmers comprise the core opposition to 
federal regulation of the rangeland.  Compared to the more than three 
hundred million people living in the U.S.,12 these ranchers comprise a very 
small and very vocal minority advocating for a way of life stamped onto the 
national consciousness by the likes of John Wayne,13 Gary Cooper,14 Elvis 
Presley,15 Paul Newman and Robert Redford,16 and Henry Fonda.17  Colvin 
Cattle is a strong statement that the glamorous Western ideology 
represented in the movies starring these men must yield to federal 
regulation of grazing on federal land. 
Colvin Cattle's simple logic will have a marked effect on pending and 
future eminent domain cases concerning federal grazing permits.  Already, 
Colvin Cattle persuaded the New Mexico Supreme Court that federal law 
preempts state law with respect to property rights in federal grazing permits 
in a case called Walker v. United States, 162 P.3d 882, 888 (N.M. 2007).  The 
precedential and persuasive value of the Colvin Cattle decision will continue 
to impact cases involving federal grazing permits.  While the Supreme Court 
might be tempted to sway this area of law toward a Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon 
style takings analysis,18 the facts in Colvin Cattle would not support this 
attempt.  Indeed, the Supreme Court would have to wait for a clearly defined 
private property right under state law.  Given the strength of the Colvin Cattle 
precedent such a fact pattern is unlikely to arise any time soon. 
the cattle produced in the United States comes from federal land.  COGGINS ET AL., 
supra note 7, at 777-778. 
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: United States (July 2007
est.), available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/print/ 
us.html. 
13. THE SEARCHERS (C.V. Whitney Pictures & Warner Brothers Pictures 1956).
14. HIGH NOON (Stanley Kramer Productions 1952).
15. FLAMING STAR (Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation 1960).
16. BUTCH CASSIDY AND THE SUNDANCE KID (Campanile Productions Inc. &
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation 1969). 
17. ONCE UPON A TIME IN THE WEST (A Rafran-San Marco Production &
Paramount Pictures, 1968). 
18. 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (state law controls the definition of property for
purposes of a Fifth Amendment takings analysis). 
4/20/2008  8:09:09 AM 
West  Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 2, Summer 2008 
1616 
II. The Politics of Rangeland Management in the West: A Local Affair
A bare analysis of the legal issues in Colvin Cattle is a priori incomplete 
because the adversaries have also put ideological concepts on trial.  At stake 
for the ranchers is a way of life idealizing self-sufficiency, the freedom of the 
range, the cowboy of the American West, and the spirit of liberty the cowboy 
represents.  At stake for federal regulators are public policy concerns about 
what is best for the majority of Americans, including ecosystem 
management practices to reduce rangeland degradation. 
In 1968, L.C. Colvin acquired the 520-acre 40 Bar Ranch, bordering the 
625,000 acre Montezuma Allotment south of Tonopah, in Central Nevada.19  
Control over the ranch passed from L.C. Colvin to his son, Ben Colvin, when 
they formed Colvin Cattle Company, Incorporated (Colvin) in 1969 to 
manage the ranch.20  Nevada is hard, dry country; the BLM estimates that, in 
an average year, it takes 636 acres of land to provide adequate forage for one 
cow.21  The Colvins embody the pioneer spirit in this harsh environment and 
represent to many locals the ranching way of life — a way of life 
characterized by self-sufficiency and a spirit of liberty.22 
Ben Colvin comes from a ranching family and feels strongly about 
fighting for his way of life.23 "[I]ts [sic] a good day when you can ride a horse 
and work with cattle . . . I suppose the day I quit running cows will be the day 
they pat me in the face with the shovel."24  In spite of his personal 
dedication, none of Ben Colvin's five children will continue the ranching 
trade,25 which may be one reason why he is risking his ranch to challenge 
federal regulation of his grazing permits.  Without these grazing permits, 
Colvin's ranch, like many others in the West, would be unable to continue 
cattle operations.  Another reason for Ben Colvin's willingness to take risks 
may derive from his bitter struggle against over-populated wild horses and 
burros that negatively affect the ranch's viability, yet remain protected under 
19. Corrected Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 3-4, Colvin Cattle Co. v. United States,
468 F.3d 803 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (No. 06-5012). 
20. Id.
21. Colleen Cahill, Interview: Ben Colvin Stands His Ground, CORNERSTONE, Vol. 9,
January 2002, available at http://www.stewardsoftherange.org/cornerstone/jan2002/ 
csjan02-1.asp. 
22. Stewards of the Range, Rancher Objects to Use of Excessive Force in Roundup,
LIBERTY MATTERS, July 30, 2001, available at http://www.libertymatters.org/newsservice/ 
2001/faxback/7.31.01stewardspressrelease.htm. 
23. Cahill, supra note 21.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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the Wild Free Roaming Horses and Burros Act (WFRHBA).26 The wild 
animals' overgrazing forced herd reductions on the ranch, from nine 
hundred head of cattle to fifty.27  When the BLM instituted a new Range 
Management Plan (RMP) in 1994, Ben Colvin had had enough.  He refused 
to sign a new permit and stopped paying grazing fees.28 
Colvin has grazing priority on and owns state law stockwatering rights 
in the federal land comprising the Montezuma Allotment.29  Ben Colvin 
explained that "[a]ccording to law, you have to use those waters within 5 
years or you lose them.  As long as I had my cattle off, the BLM was in a 
good position to take those water rights from me."30  So Ben Colvin put his 
cows back on the land and refused to sign a federal grazing permit.  He 
became a trespasser and a martyr for ranchers and their struggle against big 
government and grinding bureaucracy.31 
Ben Colvin explained that he could not be trespassing on federal land, 
which he considers his own but which the BLM calls public land, because 
his cattle grazing rights were lawfully acquired appurtenant to his purchase 
of his private ranchland.32  "From that point forward it has not been public 
land," he continued, "[m]y allotment is a privately-owned surface estate right 
on federal lands."33  Ben Colvin delivered this ultimatum: "They [have] given 
me no choice.  I am going to pursue this one to the end."34 
From the BLM's point of view, ranchers like Ben Colvin and neighbor 
Jack Vogt were flouting the law and the agency had run out of negotiating 
options.35  Colvin owed $72,000 in fines and grazing fees accrued over the 
roughly six years since his first refusal to pay.36  Vogt's infractions were even 
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Ben Colvin claims that range surveys determined overgrazing as a result of
starving horses and burros, not his cattle, and that the RMP was unfairly imposed on 
him as a result of gross BLM mismanagement.  “I would’ve still been signing my 
permit and paying my grazing fees if they had taken those horses down to economic 
levels.”  Id. 
29. Colvin Cattle Co., v. United States, 468 F.3d 803, 805 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
30. Cahill, supra note 21.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Stewards of the Range, supra note 22.
34. Id.
35. Jon Christensen, Showdown on the Nevada Range, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, August
27, 2001, available at http://www.hcn.org/servlets/hcn.Article?article_id=10672. 
36. Id.
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more egregious, totaling a whopping $237,000.37  In 2001, the BLM had no 
other options and impounded the cows.38 
Contract cowboys in helicopters working for the BLM impounded sixty-
two head of Colvin cattle from federal lands.39  According to the BLM's press 
release, "[t]he livestock [had] been grazing on and off public lands without a 
permit or without authorization for more than five years."40  All those 
involved in the seizure came under immediate scrutiny from local officials 
and cattle activists — scrutiny headlined by Ex-Representative Helen 
Chenoweth-Hage and her citizen petition drive for a grand jury investigation 
of James Connelley, the state brand inspector for Esmeralda County.41  As 
brand inspector, Connelley was a local government official authorizing 
federal ownership of the seized cows, thus making himself into a lightning rod 
for local outrage.42  Ben Colvin took action as well, swearing out a warrant for 
"the arrest of all those involved in the taking of his property without due 
process of law."43  Local sentiment was firmly on the side of the Colvins. 
Local resistance mounted as the auction of Colvin and Vogt's 
impounded cows approached.  Protestors lined the auction yard, motivated 
by the prevailing sentiment that the BLM had engaged in cattle rustling, a 
capital offense in the protesters' opinions.44  According to the Nevada 
Committee for Full Statehood, which organized the protest, "[Nevada 
residents are] not sovereign citizens.  We're serfs under King BLM and King 
Forest Service."45  It should come as no surprise that no one bid on the cattle.46 
Many ranchers in Nevada and across the West have deep-rooted 
ideological problems with federal agency management of the rangeland in 
general.47  They ask questions such as "[d]id the Founding Fathers really 
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. JoLynn Worley, BLM Takes Action on Livestock Trespass, Bureau of Land
Management, Release Number: 2001-63, July 27, 2001, available at 
http://www.nv.blm.gov/news_releases/Press_Releases/fy_2001/PR_01_63.htm. 
40. Id.
41. Scott Sonner, Chenoweth-Hage Seeks Cattle Seizure Probe, CASPER STAR TRIBUNE,
September 6, 2003, available at http://www.casperstartribune.net/articles/2003/09/06/ 
news/wyoming/cd9d21655e3d6d65961a7878960e92f8.txt. 
42. Id.
43. Stewards of the Range, supra note 22.
44. Christensen, supra note 35.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Susan Searcy, Special Collections: a Guide to the Records of The Sagebrush Rebellion,
Collection No. 85-04, University of Nevada, Reno Libraries (2006), available at 
http://www.library.unr.edu/specoll/mss/85-04.html. 
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intend for the federal government to permanently own 87 percent of Nevada 
. . . 68 percent of Utah . . . for as long as the sun shall shine?"48  According to 
interviews with agency officials reported in High Country News in 2001, there 
are more cases like this one just waiting to happen.49  These ranchers seem 
willing to sacrifice everything in the fight for control over the land and their 
ideal of freedom.50  In some cases they may feel as though they have nothing 
to lose as BLM permit requirements drive them to the brink of bankruptcy.51  
This unrest implicates the BLM's ability to manage public lands in the face 
of resistance from local ranchers. 
III. The Battle in Court
In its final decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit upheld a Court of Federal Claims' dismissal of Colvin's takings and 
contract claims in its entirety.52  These claims can be broken down into six 
parts: first, Colvin claimed a government taking of its private property in 
grazing rights on federal land obtained with the purchase of its ranch and 
appurtenant to its state law stockwatering rights; second, Colvin claimed the 
reduction in the value of its ranch due to the loss of these grazing rights also 
constituted a taking; third, Colvin claimed that its state stockwatering rights 
had been taken by private parties; fourth, that its state stockwatering rights 
had been taken by animals under the control of the BLM; fifth, Colvin 
claimed breach of contract, as an alternative to claim one; and sixth, Colvin 
claimed the value of range improvements it had installed on the federal land 
under a compensation provision of FLPMA.53 
A. The Supreme Court's Takings Jurisprudence
Takings jurisprudence stems directly from the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, which states, "nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation."54  For the purpose of 
48. Editorial, They Used to be Called Rustlers, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, August 5,
2001, available at http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj_home/2001/Aug-05-Sun-2001/ 
opinion/16696857.html. 
49. Christensen, supra note 35.
50. Id.
51. Wayne Hage, Nevada Rancher Challenges the Grazing Permit System,
CORNERSTONE, Vol. 8, September 2001, available at http://www.stewardsoftherange.org/ 
cornerstone/sept2001/cssept01-2.asp. 
52. Colvin Cattle Co. v. United States, 468 F.3d 803, 809 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
53. Id. at 806; 43 U.S.C. § 1752(g) (2000).
54. U.S. CONST. amend V.
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addressing Colvin's claims, a court must first address the "private property" 
aspect of the Amendment, without which there can be no taking.55  A further 
crucial distinction stems from the "taken" aspect of the clause and the extent 
to which a property interest need be compromised before the court will find 
a taking. 
The long and complex history of Supreme Court interpretation of the 
takings clause boils down to three principle cases.  In Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), the Court established a 
set of factors of particular significance to what it called an "essentially ad 
hoc, factual inquir[y]" to determine when a taking has occurred due to 
government regulation.56  These factors are: (1) the economic impact of the 
regulation;57 (2) the interference of the regulation with the investment-
backed expectations of a private property owner; and (3) the character of the 
government action as between the poles of a physical invasion of private 
property (more likely to be a taking) and a mere adjustment of the "benefits 
and burdens of economic life to promote the common good."58  This multi-
factor takings calculus seldom results in a taking, largely because there are 
no fixed, applicable standards and concepts such as "the common good" are 
extremely flexible.  These manipulable standards provide government 
entities with a great deal of leeway.59 
55. See, e.g., United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488 (1973) (no property right is
created in grazing permits where lands to be aggregated are themselves owned by 
the condemnor and used by the condemnee only under revocable permit from the 
condemnor, as is the case with federal lands administered under the TGA). 
56. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
57. “The Penn Central inquiry turns in large part, albeit not exclusively, upon the
magnitude of a regulation’s economic impact and the degree to which it interferes 
with legitimate property interests.”  Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540 
(2005) (the magnitude or character of the burden placed upon private property rights, 
rather than the legislative intent of such a burden, is the sole basis for a 
determination of Fifth Amendment takings). 
58. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
59. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a
Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 566 (the diminution in value test has been applied by 
courts on the basis of undisclosed, ad hoc value judgments); Karl Manheim, Tenant 
Eviction Protection and the Takings Clause, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 925, 1019 (takings cases are 
often marked by a lack of structure and there is great difficulty in establishing 
coherent or enduring rules in this area, as evidenced by the lack of a stable majority 
in the Supreme Court on these cases). 
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Penn Central is bordered by two per se takings rules.60  The first of these 
rules was established in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CatV Corporation, 458 
U.S. 419 (1982): 
We affirm the traditional rule that a permanent physical 
occupation of property is a taking.  In such a case, the 
property owner entertains a historically rooted expectation 
of compensation, and the character of the invasion is 
qualitatively more intrusive than perhaps any other 
category of property regulation.  We do not, however, 
question the equally substantial authority upholding a 
State's broad power to impose appropriate restrictions 
upon an owner's use of his property. 61 
Applying this doctrine to water rights implicates some very obvious 
physical difficulties.62  Holding a stream or a pond in your hands is no easy 
task — doing so would be no less a Sisyphean task than that of applying real 
property law to a dynamic resource like water. 
The other per se rule of takings jurisprudence has a more facile 
application to water law, though not one without its share of controversy.63  
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), the Supreme 
Court held that "there are good reasons for our frequently expressed belief 
that when the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all 
economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to 
leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking."64  In other 
words, if a regulation renders private property economically worthless, such 
regulation constitutes a taking.65 However, an imaginative lawyer can often 
60. “Our precedents stake out two categories of regulatory action that
generally will be deemed per se takings for Fifth Amendment purposes. . . . Outside 
these two relatively narrow categories . . . regulatory takings challenges are governed 
by the standards set forth in Penn Central.”  Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538 (citations omitted). 
61. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441 (emphasis in original).
62. See, e.g., Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313
(2001) (federal government water use restrictions under the Endangered Species Act 
were held to be a per se physical taking of plaintiffs’ water rights under Loretto). 
63. See, e.g., Stupak-Thrall v. United States, 89 F.3d 1269 (6th Cir. 1996) (judgment
of the district court affirmed because an en banc court was equally divided, seven 
members in favor of affirmation and seven in favor of reversal, affirmation meaning 
that riparian, and other valid existing rights, are not ossified against further 
regulation, in spite of congressional language acknowledging the existence of such 
rights in the wilderness acts). 
64. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019.
65. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 346 (2002). 
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come up with an economically viable use for a piece of real property, 
substantially narrowing the scope of this rule.66 
B. Basis of the Colvin Cattle Decision
The foundational assumption of the court's decision in Colvin Cattle is 
that Congress possesses power analogous to state police power over federal 
lands.67  This assumption is based on the Property Clause of the United 
States Constitution, Article IV, Section Three, Clause Two. United States v. 
Gratiot, 39 U.S. 526 (1840) interpreted this clause to mean that congressional 
power to regulate federal land is essentially unlimited: "Congress has the 
same power over [the public lands] as over any other property belonging to 
the United States; and this power is vested in Congress without limitation."68  
This means that the federal government's allowance of grazing on public 
land does not confer any vested right, nor does it deprive the federal 
government of the power to recall any implied license under which the land 
had been used for private purposes.69  Because of the assumption of 
congressional supremacy, which both parties in Colvin Cattle conceded, 
Congress must specifically authorize any property right before it can vest.70 
And, as the above discussion points out, a vested property right is absolutely 
necessary to support a finding of unlawful government appropriation.71 
Congressional action on grazing is concentrated in two major statutes: 
the TGA72 and FLPMA.73  The court in Colvin Cattle found that "[b]ecause the 
vesting of any property right to graze on public lands subsequent to the 
66. Id.  (“The Court does not dispute that petitioners were forced to leave their
land economically idle during this period. . . . But the Court refuses to apply Lucas on 
the ground that the deprivation was ‘temporary.’”); see also, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 
U.S. 606 (2001) (property owner failed to show deprivation of all economic value 
where a residence could be built on the land under the challenged regulation); see, 
e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, The Measure of a Justice: Justice Scalia and the Faltering of the Property
Rights Movement Within the Supreme Court, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 759 (suggesting that Justice
Scalia may have overplayed his hand by trying to change the law in one fell swoop,
and that the oddness of the factual basis in Lucas and the background principles
rationale used by Scalia’s majority opinion in the case have marginalized its value
as precedent).
67. Colvin Cattle Co. v. United States, 468 F.3d 803, 806 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
68. Gratiot, 39 U.S. at 537.
69. Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 535 (1911).
70. Colvin Cattle, 468 F.3d at 807.
71. United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 493 (1973).
72. 43 U.S.C. § 315, et seq (2000).
73. 43 U.S.C. § 1701, et seq (2000).
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enactment of the TGA would be inconsistent with the act, any grazing right 
that Colvin possesses necessarily must have vested prior to its enactment."74  
Prior to 1934, all grazing on public lands was under an implied license, left 
open only so long as the government did not cancel its silent consent.75  
Based on the absolute supremacy of congressional authority in this area, the 
court in Colvin Cattle found that "any water right that Colvin or its 
predecessors obtained could not and did not include an attendant right to 
graze on public lands."76  To hold otherwise in Colvin Cattle, the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit would have implicitly brought Supreme Court 
precedent in cases like Fuller, Light, and Gratiot into question by carving out a 
previously non-existent exception to absolute congressional authority over 
federal lands for water rights vested under state law. 
Despite this seemingly absolute statement concerning federal law, the 
court nonetheless moved the discussion to state law.77  It appears that the 
court gave its imprimatur to Colvin's analysis of the Mining Act of 1866 
(Mining Act), stating that Colvin's "argument begins well enough" in 
following the Mining Act to a reliance on Nevada law.78  However, the court 
concluded that there is ultimately no basis in Nevada law for a right to graze 
appurtenant to state stockwatering rights.79  
C. Applying the Basis of the Decision to Colvin's Claims
The court used a two prong approach, established by M & J Coal Co. and 
Monongah Development Co. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1148 (Fed. Cir. 1995), to 
analyze takings claims involving land use restrictions, concluding that Colvin 
74. Colvin Cattle, 468 F.3d at 807.
75. Id., citing Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 535 (1911).  See also
Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 352 (1918) (while states can regulate activity on 
federal land, state law is trumped by federal law and the states can not create any 
sort of legally protected interest in federal lands); Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320, 326 
(1890) (failure by the federal government to object to a particular use of public land 
does not vest private property rights in such use). 
76. Colvin Cattle, 468 F.3d at 807.
77. Id.
78. Id. (citations omitted).  (“[U]nder the Mining Act of 1866 and the TGA, the
United States recognizes vested state law-based water rights.”). 
79. Id. at 807-08.  This, in fact, is the most exhaustive section of the court’s
decision and includes a survey of the Nevada Stockwatering Act and Nevada 
Supreme Court cases In re Calvo, 253 P. 671 (Nev. 1927), Itcaina v. Marble, 55 P.2d 625 
(Nev. 1936), and Ansolabehere v. Laborde, 310 P.2d 842 (Nev. 1957).  The conclusions the 
court in Colvin Cattle reaches, based upon Nevada law, will be addressed in V. Analysis 
of the Decision in Colvin Cattle, infra. 
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could not get past the first prong.80  Under this first prong, a use interest 
must be part of the owner's title at the time of purchase if government 
interference with the use is to constitute a taking.81  "If the claimant can 
establish the existence of such an interest," the second prong asks "whether 
the governmental action at issue constituted a compensable taking of that 
[use interest]."82  Citing both M & J Coal and Lucas, the court in Colvin Cattle 
found that "[Colvin's] claim fails because, under the first prong, grazing is 
not a stick in the bundle of rights that it has ever acquired."83  Basing its 
argument on Lucas, the court pointed out that there can be no per se taking 
unless the first prong of M & J Coal is satisfied.84  Even a change in a grazing 
permit which renders a protected property right valueless would not be 
enough to satisfy the first prong of M & J Coal because the grazing permit 
itself is not a protected property right under state law.85  Thus, the court 
decided against Colvin on its first claim that the BLM's revocation of its 
grazing allotment constituted a taking of Colvin's water rights.86 
Because Colvin has no protected property interest in its grazing 
allotment under state law, and because of Supreme Court precedent,87 the 
court in Colvin Cattle found that any diminution of value of the ranch by BLM 
grazing restrictions is also non-compensable.88  The court explained that 
"such loss in value [from a revoked grazing permit] has not occurred by 
virtue of governmental restrictions on a constitutionally cognizable property 
interest."89  Thus, Colvin's second claim was invalid because a takings claim 
80. Colvin Cattle, 468 F.3d. at 808.
81. M & J Coal Co. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1148, 1154 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
82. Id.
83. Colvin Cattle, 468 F.3d. at 808 (citing M & J Coal, 47 F.3d at 1153-54).  This
“bundle of rights” language is drawn from Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 
U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992) (“Our ‘takings’ jurisprudence . . . has traditionally been guided 
by the understandings of our citizens regarding the content of, and the State's power 
over, the ‘bundle of rights’ that they acquire when they obtain title to property. . . . 
[T]he property owner necessarily expects the uses of his property to be
restricted . . . by various measures newly enacted by the State in legitimate
exercise of its police powers.”).
84. Colvin Cattle, 468 F.3d. at 808.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539-40 (1976); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027;
United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 493 (1973). 
88. Colvin Cattle, 468 F.3d at 808.
89. Id.  (holding that “the Fifth Amendment does not require the Government to
pay for that element of value based on the use of respondent’s fee lands in 
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cannot be based on a property value conferred by the United States under a 
revocable permit.90  Once again, the court's rationale was firmly centered on 
the nature of the property interest claimed by Colvin, revealing the vital role 
played by the definition of state property rights under the Supreme Court's 
takings jurisprudence.91 
Colvin's third claim, that the BLM allowed Colvin's successor to 
infringe on Colvin's water rights, was dismissed for two reasons.92  The first 
reason was that the BLM stipulated in the grazing permit issued to Bud 
Johnson (the private party authorized to graze on the Montezuma Allotment 
in Colvin's place) that he had to haul all of his own water and could not use 
Colvin's water rights.93  The second reason was that "the United States 
cannot be held responsible for the incursion on water rights by a private 
party."94  Bud Johnson is not an instrument of the government, thus the 
government cannot be held responsible for his actions.95 
This discussion of the instrumentality of third parties led directly to 
the invalidation of Colvin's fourth claim.96  The court in Colvin Cattle held that 
the federal government is no more responsible for the actions of wild horses 
than it is for the actions of private parties.97  The court explained that, 
"because wild horses are outside the government's control, they cannot 
constitute an instrumentality of the government capable of giving rise to a 
taking."98  Horses, like other wild animals, are independent actors rather 
than agents of the government.99  Moreover, the rancher's dominion over the 
combination with the Government’s permit lands.”  (quoting Fuller, 409 U.S. at 493 
(emphasis in original))). 
90. Fuller, 409 U.S. at 493.
91. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1012 (1984) (citation omitted)
(“If Congress can ‘pre-empt’ state property law . . . then the Taking Clause has lost all 
vitality. . . . [A] sovereign, ‘by ipse dixit, may not transform private property into public 
property without compensation. . . . This is the very kind of thing that the Taking 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment was meant to prevent.’”)  See also Pennsylvania Coal, 260 
U.S. 393, 414 (1922) (decision based upon the existence under Pennsylvania law of a 
separate and very important support estate). 
92. Colvin Cattle, 468 F.3d at 808-09.
93. Id. at 806.




98. Id.  (citing Alves, 133 F.3d at 1457-58 (citations omitted)).
99. Mountain States Legal Found. v. Hodel, 799 F.2d 1423 (10th Cir. 1986) (no
possible takings claim because horses are wild animals and are not agents of the 
federal government). 
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parcel as a whole is still largely intact, tipping the balance in Colvin Cattle 
against a claim of complete government appropriation.100 
Though the court in Colvin Cattle did not specifically address the point, 
it is clear that the economic impact on the property as a whole did not raise 
Colvin's claim to the level of a taking.  Colvin still has the right to access its 
water and exclude private users and wild animals alike.101  "Although Colvin 
may no longer access the allotment for grazing purposes, the government 
has not impeded its access to water."102  The Supreme Court, in Mountain 
States Legal Foundation v. Hodel, addressed the issue of wild animals as well: 
"[a]dmittedly, the grazing habits of the wild horses has [sic] diminished the 
value of the . . . property.  But a reduction in the value of property is not 
necessarily equated with a taking."103  A long line of precedent supports the 
Colvin Cattle court's implied stance that diminution in value alone is not 
enough to constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment.104 
Colvin's contract claim was based on his permit with the BLM, and the 
court eliminated this claim on a jurisdictional flaw without ever reaching the 
facts of the case.105  Because suit was not filed until 1993, more than eight 
years after Colvin's failure to pay, any breach of contract claim was barred by 
the statute of limitations imposed in the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2501.106 
Therefore, the court in Colvin Cattle left unresolved the question of whether a 
breach of contract claim can be brought at all under TGA § 315(b) lease.107 
Finally, the court cited another jurisdictional issue to defeat Colvin's 
sixth and final claim concerning compensation under FLPMA for range 
100. See Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130
(1978), (“Taking’ jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete 
segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have 
been entirely abrogated.”) 
101. Colvin Cattle, 468 F.3d at 806.
102. Id.
103. Mountain States, 799 F.2d at 1430-31.
104. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 131 (“[A] showing of diminution in property
value would not establish a ‘taking’ if the restriction had been imposed as a result of 
historic-district legislation . . ..”).  See also Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405 
(1915) (92.5% diminution in value is insufficient to establish a taking); Euclid v. Ambler 
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926) (75 percent diminution in value is insufficient to 
establish a taking); Concrete Pipe & Products of Cal., Inc., v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust., 
508 U.S. 602, 645 (1993) (“mere diminution in the value of property, however serious, 
is insufficient to demonstrate a taking”). 
105. Colvin Cattle, 468 F.3d at 809.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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improvements.108  FLPMA requires a request be submitted to the Secretary of 
the Interior for a determination of the value of improvements as a 
prerequisite for a compensation claim.109  Accordingly, the court ruled that 
Colvin's claim was not ripe for adjudication because Colvin failed to exhaust 
administrative remedies by requesting a value estimate.110 
IV. Resulting Issues
Colvin Cattle, at about twelve pages, represents the median length of a 
decision published by the Federal Circuit.111  As such, it is no great surprise 
that Colvin Cattle leaves some issues in this controversial area of law 
unanswered.  One such issue is that the court did not squarely confront the 
Mining Act's grant of congressional authority to the states to determine 
private property rights on public land.112  As a result, it left the door open for 
further federal court involvement in state law interpretation.  Given the 
national character of the Court of Federal Claims and its home in 
Washington, D.C., judges involved in future cases may well prove to be wary 
of over-involvement in state law disputes with which they have little or no 
experience.113  This may well result in a trend toward the certification of state 
law issues to state supreme courts, as in Walker v. United States, 69 Fed. Cl. 
222 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 2005) (No. 29,544),114 significantly drawing out the time it 
takes to resolve a case involving water rights on federal lands. 
108. Id.
109. 43 U.S.C. § 1752(g) (2000).
110. Colvin Cattle, 468 F.3d at 809; see  also, Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp.,
303 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1938) (rule requiring the exhaustion of an administrative 
remedy cannot be circumvented by asserting that the charge on which the 
complaint rests is groundless). 
111. A brief Lexis survey reveals that of the seven published decisions issued
in 2006 from the panel of Judge Mayer, Judge Newman, and Judge Rader, the longest 
decision is fifteen pages while the shortest is five pages, with Colvin Cattle squarely in 
the median at twelve pages. 
112. See V. Analysis of the Decision in Colvin Cattle, infra, as well as note 78, supra. 
113. See VI. Analysis of Related Cases in Light of Colvin Cattle, infra.
114. Two questions of state property law were certified by the Court of Federal
Claims to the New Mexico Supreme Court in Walker: “1. Does the law of the State of 
New Mexico recognize a limited forage right implicit in a vested water right?  2. Does 
the law of the State of New Mexico law [sic] recognize a limited forage right implicit 
in a right-of-way for the maintenance and enjoyment of a vested water right?”  Walker, 
69 Fed. Cl. at 232-33.  Walker is addressed in detail in VI. Analysis of Related Cases in 
Light of Colvin Cattle, infra.  For more on certification of state law issues to state 
supreme courts, see Arizonans for Official English v. Ariz., 520 U.S. 43, 76 (1997) 
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The Federal Circuit is the binding authority for a majority of the cases 
brought against the federal government because it handles appeals from the 
Court of Federal Claims.115  Under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (1997), 
the Court of Federal Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over cases against the 
government where damages exceed $10,000.116  Because the median price of 
a parcel of land in the United States is significantly greater than $10,000, the 
vast majority of property claims are quite likely to exceed this relatively low 
jurisdictional threshold.117  Because the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction over 
appeals from the Court of Federal Claims,118 it will set the tone of the lower 
court's takings jurisprudence.  
V. Analysis of the Decision in Colvin Cattle
In Colvin Cattle, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit took a 
strong stance on federal rangeland policy and a bona fide first step toward 
reversing a disturbing trend toward an increase in grazing permit litigation. 
The key to this stance rests in the court's disposal of state law issues. 
(“Certification procedure . . . allows a federal court faced with a novel state-law 
question to put the question directly to the State's highest court, reducing the delay, 
cutting the cost, and increasing the assurance of gaining an authoritative 
response.”); Pittman v. Cole, 267 F.3d 1269, 1288 (11th Cir. 2001); Northland Family 
Planning Clinic, Inc. v. Cox, 487 F.3d 323, 343 (6th Cir. 2007); Psinet, Inc. v. Chapman, 317 
F.3d 413, 424 (4th Cir. 2003); and Tunick v. Safir, 209 F.3d 67, 84 (2d Cir. 2000).
115. Under 28 U.S.C § 1295(a)(3) (2000), “[t]he United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction . . . of an appeal from a final 
decision of the United States Court of Federal Claims.”  The Federal Circuit also has 
appellate jurisdiction over the Boards of Contract Appeals, the United States 
International Trade Commission, and the United States Court of International Trade, 
as well as certain other types of appeals from the United States District Courts.  28 
U.S.C. § 1295. 
116. While 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2)(1997) limits the jurisdiction of the district
courts to any “civil action or claim against the United States, not exceeding $ 10,000 
in amount,” the Court of Federal Claims is not so limited: “The United States Court of 
Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the 
United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any 
regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with 
the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding 
in tort.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2001). 
117. According to the United States Census Bureau, the median and average
sales prices of new homes sold in the United States in 2006 were $246,500 and 
$305,900, respectively. U.S. Census Bureau, Median and Average Sales Prices of New Homes 
Sold in United States, Annual Data, available at http://www.census.gov/const/uspriceann.pdf. 
118. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2000).
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Federal takings jurisprudence, as it applies to the overlap of TGA grazing 
permits and state water rights, tends to be steered back to state supreme 
courts for determinations of state property law.  This course is largely 
mandated by the jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court, but the Federal 
Circuit adds its own imprimatur to certification procedures. 
It was convenient for the Federal Circuit that the Nevada Supreme 
Court left a swath of jurisprudence stating that there is no property right 
established by the Stockwatering Act of 1925, the primary basis for Colvin's 
claim.  This swath is wide enough to withstand U.S. Supreme Court review, 
something that the Federal Circuit must be especially mindful of.119  In the 
wake of backlash from Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005),120 the 
conservative members of the Court are likely eager to reassert their property 
rights credentials.  Other cases addressing similar issues have not been so 
clear because they concern state laws less clear than Nevada's, resulting in a 
cautious Court of Federal Claims opting to certify vital questions of state 
property law to state supreme courts. 
A. Federal Law Can Stand Alone
The Federal Circuit in Colvin Cattle may have partially based its decision 
on state law,121 but state law was unnecessary for the court's ultimate 
conclusion.  According to the opinion issued by the Court of Federal Claims, 
affirmed by Colvin Cattle, there is adequate jurisprudence to support the 
notion that state water rights confer, if anything, only minimal, narrow rights 
of access.122  The lower court explained that "the Ninth and Tenth Circuits 
have expressly rejected the assertion that a right to graze on federal lands is 
attendant to a state water right."123  While the Federal Circuit declined to 
address the issue in as much detail, its support for the lower court's 
reasoning is clear.124 
The federal issues are spelled out by the Federal Circuit in a simple 
and straightforward manner that admits of no possibility that a rancher 
could possess some sort of vested property right in a federal grazing 
119. See supra text accompanying notes 83-91.
120. Holding that a disposition of property to increase tax revenue and
revitalize economically blighted areas of the City of New London qualifies as a public 
use under Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence.  Kelo, 545 U.S. at 493. 
121. Colvin Cattle Co. v. United States, 468 F.3d 803, 807-08 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
122. Colvin Cattle Co. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 568, 574 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 2005).
123. Id. (citations omitted).
124. Colvin Cattle, 468 F.3d at 808 (“[G]razing is not a stick in the bundle of
rights that [Colvin] has ever acquired.”). 
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permit.125  State property law is irrelevant, the court says, because state law 
"could not have conferred such a [property] right, even if it had tried. 
Because the Montezuma Allotment is and always has been federal land, no 
right in it may be obtained without congressional authorization."126  In an 
ideal world, the court would not have confused the issue by including the 
state law rationale as more than a footnote, instead basing its decision 
wholly on the strong foundation of federal law in this area.127  However, the 
Colvin Cattle decision is clear enough precedent that future litigation should 
be able to avoid certification — a desirable outcome because of the 
complicated and time-consuming procedures involved in certifying a 
question for state court review.128 
Beyond the four corners of the Colvin decision, there is robust support 
for the notion that grazing permits and related leases or preferences confer 
no compensable property right in the underlying federal land.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court has held that the BLM has the discretion to reclassify or 
withdraw rangeland from grazing use, alter internal regulations concerning 
grazing permits, and either adjust an individual permit's cattle numbers or 
cancel the permit altogether in cases of misuse.129  Fuller, discussed earlier, 
125. Id.
126. Id.  The court is specifically referring to the Nevada Stockwatering Act of
1925. 
127. See, e.g., Hunter v. United States, 388 F.2d 148, 153-54 (9th Cir. 1967) (grant of
water rights does not carry with it an easement to graze because grazing is not 
essential to the use of the water right); Diamond Bar Cattle Co. v. United States, 168 F.3d 
1209 (10th Cir. 1999) (New Mexico law does not attach a private property right to 
graze on federal lands to vested stockwatering rights); see also, Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 
U.S. 529, 539-41 (1976) (congressional power over the public lands is that of both a 
proprietor and a legislator, necessarily including the power to regulate and protect 
wildlife on federal land, and as such should be broadly construed and is unlimited by 
the laws of the states). 
128. See, e.g., Randall T. Shepard, Symposium on Tomorrow’s Issues in State
Constitutional Law: Is Making State Constitutional Law Through Certified Questions a Good Idea 
or a Bad Idea? 38 VAL. U.L. REV. 327 (2004).  Alternatively, for a defense of certification, 
see The Council on Judicial Administration and the Committee on Federal Courts, 
Report and Recommendations on Second Circuit Certification of Determinative State Law Issues to 
the New York Court of Appeals, 54 THE RECORD 310 (1999).  Both sides seem to agree, 
however, that certification imposes significant additional litigation costs and delays 
on the parties involved.  54 The Record at 313-14. 
129. Public Lands Council v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 728, 742-43 (2000) (Secretary of the
Interior did not exceed his authority under the TGA by amending regulations 
governing grazing preferences, permit issuance, and ownership of range 
improvements). 
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makes clear that the Court does not read the TGA to create any 
compensable property right in permit lands.130 
The courts of appeal have also weighed in against the notion that a 
property right has been created by grazing permits.  The Tenth Circuit 
explained that because such permits confer a privilege rather than a right, 
they do not constitute property as defined in the Fifth Amendment's Takings 
Clause.131  The Federal Circuit came to the same conclusion in Alves.132  Even 
Hage v. United States, a series of cases presided over by Chief Judge Loren 
Smith of the Court of Federal Claims and representing the most success 
ranchers have had in this area, found only a limited right to graze within fifty 
feet of a water-filled ditch in which a state law water right has vested under 
the Mining Act.133 
B. Potential for an Appeal to the United States Supreme Court
Colvin's petition for rehearing en banc was denied by the Federal 
Circuit in February of 2007.134  Given Ben Colvin's personal and ideological 
circumstances and the binding nature of any precedent set by the Federal 
Circuit,135 an appeal of this decision to the United States Supreme Court 
might have appeared a foregone conclusion.  Ben Colvin had claimed to 
have committed himself to see the process through, and support for his 
130. United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 494 (1973) (“[t]he provisions of the
[TGA] quoted supra make clear the congressional intent that no compensable 
property might be created in the permit lands themselves as a result of the issuance 
of the permit”). 
131. Federal Lands Legal Consortium v. United States, 195 F.3d 1190, 1196 (10th Cir.
1999) (citing United States v. Cox, 190 F.2d 293, 296 (10th Cir. 1951) (“Although the 
permits are valuable to the ranchers, they are not an interest protected by the Fifth 
Amendment against the taking by the Government who granted them with the 
understanding that they could be withdrawn at any time without the payment of 
compensation.”)). 
132. Alves v. United States, 133 F.3d 1454, 1457-58 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also,
Diamond Bar Cattle Co., 168 F.3d at 1217 (“license was revocable at the government’s 
pleasure and conferred no right in plaintiffs or their predecessors to graze a specific 
allotment of land”). 
133. 51 Fed. Cl. 570, 580 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 2002) (plaintiffs have at most a right to
access the water in which they have a vested right); Hage v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 
147, 171 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 1996) (“the court emphasizes that plaintiffs’ investment-backed 
expectations and reliance on the privilege to graze do not, in themselves, create a 
property interest in the rangeland or the permit”). 
134. Colvin Cattle Co. v. United States, No. 06-5012, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 4460 at
*1-2 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
135. See IV. Resulting Issues, supra.
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cause in rural Nevada should be as strong today as it was six years ago at 
the auction house.136  Moreover, controversial cases concerning private 
property rights, like Colvin Cattle, can acquire a life of their as interested 
parties become aware of the litigation's progress.  However, Colvin's time to 
file a petition for writ of certiorari has passed without the parties seeking 
certification.  This final conclusion to the Colvin Cattle litigation reflects the 
clarity of the Court of Federal Claims' decision — if there were any way to 
keep the litigation alive, property rights advocates have repeatedly proven 
that their strategy is to do so. Thus, if this issue is to receive the attention of 
the Supreme Court, it will have to be under a different fact pattern from the 
one in Colvin Cattle. 
Colvin's arguments, both in the Court of Federal Claims and on appeal 
to the Federal Circuit, utilized classic takings language in an attempt to add 
grazing to a burgeoning collection of limitations on federal power 
engineered during the term of the Rehnquist Court.137  Chief Justice Roberts 
has engaged in some takings jurisprudence as an advocate, but his 
involvement revealed very little of what his stance on takings as Chief Justice 
might be.138  With both Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor139 gone, and 
other changes in the constitution of the Court perhaps not far behind,140 it 
136. Christensen, supra note 35.
137. See, e.g., Peter J. Smith, Federalism, Instrumentalism, and the Legacy of the
Rehnquist Court, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 906 (2006); Thomas H. Odom, An Introduction to 
the Symposium on the Federalism Decisions of the Supreme Court’s 1999 Term, 25 OKLA. CITY 
U.L. REV. 783 (2000); Frank B. Cross, The Folly of Federalism, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2002).
138. Compare Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302
(2002) (Roberts successfully represented environmentalists fighting development 
around Lake Tahoe), with Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (Roberts co-
authored the government’s successful brief opposing environmental organizational 
standing to sue in Article III courts). 
139. Justice O’Connor’s childhood on a ranch in the Southwestern United
States likely soured her on the bureaucracy of federal regulation.  Tyson R. Smith, 
Shades of Green: Justice O’Connor and the Environment, 18 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 365, 367, 380 
(2003). 
140. “A stent was inserted to clear an arterial blockage near Kennedy's heart
over the Labor Day weekend after the justice experienced chest pains. . . . he was 
released from the hospital the next day. He was back at work the day after that.”  Bill 
Mears, Justice Kennedy Works on His Swing, CNN LAW CENTER, September 29, 2006, 
available at http://www.cnn.com/2006/LAW/09/25/scotus.kennedy/index.html.  Mears 
also points out that Justice O’Connor’s retirement makes Kennedy the most 
important vote on the Supreme Court, with four liberals to his left and four 
conservatives on his right. 
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remains to be seen in what direction the Court will move on the 
controversial and muddled topic of takings.141 
Colvin's argument that federal grazing permits vest private property 
rights evokes Justice Holmes's rhetoric from Pennsylvania Coal.142  Language 
from Pennsylvania Coal drew the ideological lines that make up modern 
takings jurisprudence.143  On the one hand, "[g]overnment hardly could go 
on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished 
without paying for every such change in the general law."144  However, Justice 
Holmes continues, "[w]e are in danger of forgetting that a strong public 
desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving 
the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the 
change."145  It is this latter sentiment that Colvin attempts to capture, and 
one from which Justice Scalia's takings stance derives:146 "[w]e have 
repeatedly observed that the purpose of [the Fifth Amendment takings 
provision] is 'to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens 
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.'"147  This 
language could be applied to Colvin Cattle in the sense that individual 
ranchers are being forced to bear the burden of ecosystem management, a 
burden which some say should rather be born by the public as a whole.  This 
sort of rhetoric can only increase the likelihood of seeing a similar case 
before the Supreme Court. 
The most important equity argument from Pennsylvania Coal for the 
purposes of such future litigation lies in Justice Holmes' rhetoric. 
Pennsylvania Coal involved the right of a coal mining company to remove coal 
from the ground, a right which represented a protected property interest 
under Pennsylvania law.148  Justice Holmes explains that, "the right to coal 
consists in the right to mine it . . . What makes the right to mine coal 
valuable is that it can be exercised with profit.  To make it commercially 
141. Rehnquist died in September of 2005; Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S.
469 (2005), the last Supreme Court decision addressing Fifth Amendment private 
property rights, was handed down on June 23.  Charles Lane, Chief Justice William H. 
Rehnquist Dies, WASHINGTON POST, September 4, 2005 at A1. 
142. Corrected Reply Brief at 23, Colvin Cattle Co., Inc. v. United States, 468 F.3d
803 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (No. 06-5012). 
143. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
144. Id. at 413.
145. Id. at 416.
146. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n., 483 U.S. 825, 836 (1987) and
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1071 (1992). 
147. Pennell v. San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 19 (1988) (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364
U. S. 40, 49 (1960)) (emphasis added). 
148. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414.
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impracticable to mine certain coal has very nearly the same effect for 
constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it."149  Even though 
Pennsylvania Coal was essentially overturned on its facts by Keystone Bituminous 
Coal Association v. DeBenedictis,150 the modern Supreme Court appears to favor 
the rhetoric of its earlier decision.151  Thus, a favorable comparison to 
Pennsylvania Coal would almost certainly make its way into any future 
Supreme Court treatment of this issue. 
Colvin draws such an analogy in its appellate brief, underscoring the 
similarities between the right to coal in place and the right to water in 
place.152  "Water rights cannot exist without a right to place the water to 
beneficial use, and Colvin has alleged that its water rights were created 
under local law and custom for the sole beneficial purpose of 
stockwatering."153  For practical purposes, it is fairly obvious that the right to 
water for Colvin consists in the right to water his stock.154  Under the 
Pennsylvania Coal rationale, Colvin argued that prohibiting him from 
watering his stock was equivalent to destroying his property interest in his 
water rights.155 
149. Id. at 415 (citations omitted).
150. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).  Keystone held that a Pennsylvania statute restricting
mining operations in order to prevent subsidence did not constitute a taking. 
Keystone, 480 U.S. at 506. 
151. That, at least, was the preference of Justices Scalia and Rehnquist.  See
notes 137-38, supra.  Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote many of the takings decisions 
supporting this theory.  See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386, 391 (1994) 
(exactions required by a governmental agency as a result of a permitting process 
must be roughly proportionate to the projected impact of the proposed 
development, and there must also be an essential nexus between a legitimate state 
interest and the permit condition) and First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County 
of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321-22 (1987) (governmental action constituting a taking 
can not be undone by invalidating the suspect law). 
152. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415.
153. Corrected Reply Brief at 9, Colvin Cattle Co., Inc. v. United States, 468 F.3d 803
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (No. 06-5012). 
154. See, e.g., Hage v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 147, 175 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 1996)
(“Plaintiffs assert that in Nevada the right to bring cattle to the water, and for cattle 
to consume forage adjacent to a private water right, is inherently part of the vested 
stockwater right. Obviously, there is some logical support for this proposition even in 
light of the small amount of knowledge of bovine behavior held by the court.”  The 
Hage cases are covered in more depth in VI. Analysis of Related Cases in Light of 
Colvin Cattle, infra. 
155. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414.
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The equity aspects of an apparent government property appropriation, 
such as the conflict over water rights in Colvin Cattle, could speak 
persuasively to a country outraged by the governmental appropriation of 
family homes156 in Kelo.157  However, the Supreme Court has clearly 
disavowed much of the rationale remaining from Pennsylvania Coal and 
generally allows government regulators free reign with policy decisions.158  In 
the end, without a justice as connected to Western grazing issues as Justice 
O'Connor was,159 a Supreme Court wary of public outrage will most likely 
keep its distance unless it sees an opportunity to right the perceived wrongs 
of Kelo. 
A quick survey of the eleven Western states shows that it would be 
unlikely for a case to arise in which the Supreme Court could find that state 
property rights had been taken.  Nevada law has been covered already, and 
Section VI. B. of this Comment shows that the New Mexico Supreme Court 
believes no such interest exists there.  The California Supreme Court agrees, 
stating that "the holder of a federal grazing permit is, for the purpose of 
eminent domain proceedings, a licensee without compensable property 
rights."160  While there is no Arizona Supreme Court precedent on this issue, 
a 1973 appellate case is on point and has received sufficient subsequent 
positive treatment to render it persuasive here.  Tidwell v. State holds that 
"Appellants' permit from the federal government was a mere license and 
gave them no estate or property right in the land."161 
The Colorado Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the issue 
either, but does refer favorably to Arizona jurisprudence and cites to the 
156. See, e.g., T.R. Reid, Missouri Condemnation No Longer So Imminent: Supreme
Court Ruling Ignites Political Backlash, WASHINGTON POST, September 6, 2005, at A2; 
Michael Gardner, Cities in California Push Own Measure on Eminent Domain, S.D. UNION-
TRIBUNE, March 14, 2007, available at http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/state/ 
20070314-9999-1n14domain.html. 
157. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
158. See, e.g., FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 254 (1987) (utility pole rent
review does not constitute a taking and is not confiscatory where it provides for 
reasonable recovery of costs); Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 538-39 (1992) 
(because a mobile home ordinance does not compel owners to suffer physical 
occupation of their property it does not constitute a taking); Penn Central Transportation 
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124-125 (1978); Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. 
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 506 (1987); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning 
Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 342-343 (2002); Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540 
(2005); Kelo, 545 U.S. at 493. 
159. See note 139, supra.
160. Hubbard v. Brown, 785 P.2d 1183, 1186 (Cal. 1990).
161. 514 P.2d 1260, 1262 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973).
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proposition that "a grazing permit on the National Forest does not give 
ownership of the land or of any legal interest therein."162  The Montana 
Supreme Court also refers favorably to federal case law stating that "permits 
could be withdrawn or cancelled by the Government at any time without 
constitutional obligation to pay compensation therefore [sic]."163  From this 
survey, it appears that state law generally supports the federal primacy 
theory espoused by Colvin Cattle that "[grazing on federal public lands] . . . 
was, and remains, a privilege, not a right."164 
Ambiguities do remain in the law of Utah, Oregon, Washington, Idaho, 
and Wyoming.  Given these ambiguities, it is possible that the Supreme 
Court could mandate that, where state property law ambiguities exist, 
questions of state law should be certified to the state supreme court.  This 
hypothetical, however, is based on a number of conditions: (1) a fact pattern 
sufficiently sympathetic to state property law analysis; (2) a plaintiff willing 
to brave the hostile precedent of Colvin Cattle; (3) a Supreme Court 
sufficiently interested in furthering the certification doctrine used by the 
court in Walker165; and (4) ambiguous state property law.  A conjunction of 
these conditions appears, at the present time, rather unlikely. 
VI. Analysis of Related Cases in Light of Colvin Cattle
A. Colvin Cattle Should Result in Final Judgment Against
the Plaintiff in Hage
Colvin Cattle should have a strong influence on other cases pending in 
the Court of Federal Claims, as well as on those cases which have already 
been decided but seem to conflict with its ruling and are still ripe for 
appeal.166  In fact, it seems likely Colvin Cattle will end up having a kind of 
162. Coquina Oil Corp. v. Harry Kourlis Ranch, 643 P.2d 519, 524 (Colo. 1982)
(citing Cienega Cattle Co. v. Atkins, 126 P.2d 481, 484 (Ariz. 1942)). 
163. Ivins v. Hardy, 333 P.3d 471, 479 (Mont. 1958) (citing United States v.
Jaramillo, 190 F.2d 300, 302 (10th Cir., 1951)). 
164. Colvin Cattle Co. v. United States, 468 F.3d 803, 807 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing
Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 352 (1918)). 
165. See supra note 115.
166. See, e.g., Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313
(2001) (federal government water use restrictions under the Endangered Species Act 
were held to be a per se taking of plaintiff’s water rights under Loretto v. Teleprompter 
Mahattan CatV Corp.; 458 U.S. 419 (1982)); Walker v. United States, 69 Fed. Cl. 222 (Ct. 
Fed. Cl. 2005); Sacramento Grazing Ass’n., Inc. v. United States, 66 Fed. Cl. 211 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 
2005) (association's claim for compensation for the alleged taking of its preference 
grazing right dismissed with prejudice because no property interest was attached); 
4/20/2008  8:09:09 AM 
West  Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 2, Summer 2008 
1637 
domino effect, solving a controversy which has raged through the West for 
the last fifteen years. 
Even with all rulings interlocutory and the parties still awaiting a final 
resolution, the Hage litigation, filed in 1991, was the primary instigator of 
this controversy.167  The facts in Hage are remarkably similar to those just 
examined in Colvin Cattle; both cases involve ranchers in a dispute with the 
federal agency charged with administering federal grazing lands.168  Wayne 
Hage claimed property rights in the surface estate covered by his grazing 
permits, and in the grazing permits themselves.169  As in Colvin Cattle, the 
Federal Circuit Court in Hage dismissed these claims: "The plaintiffs have 
shown no evidence and have no legal support to sustain a viable claim for a 
property interest in grazing permits or a surface estate."170 
Basing its reasoning on language which vests a property right in the 
beneficial appropriation of water "by watering livestock directly from the 
source,"171 the Federal Circuit Court implied the existence of an appurtenant 
right to graze livestock alongside such sources in a sort of right-of-way which 
extends fifty feet on both sides of a ditch.172  Significantly, nowhere in the 
court's "FINAL OPINION: Findings of Fact"173 does it hold that Hage actually 
possesses a vested property interest in forage appurtenant to his water 
rights.  Instead, the Hage court leaves this all-important question for a later 
proceeding.174  However, even the hint of the possibility of an appurtenant 
right to forage which attaches to state water rights has been enough to stir 
up an impressive amount of litigation.175 
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit tellingly chooses not to 
address the Hage series of cases in its Colvin Cattle opinion.  It would appear 
that the Federal Circuit is not interested in issuing opinions on cases that 
are not yet final, perhaps preferring to set precedent and let the district 
and Hage v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 570 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 2002) (motion to dismiss takings 
claim concerning vested water rights has been denied). 
167. Hage v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 147 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 1996), Hage v. United States,
42 Fed. Cl. 249 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 1998), and Hage v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 570 (2002) 
(final finding of fact, leaving determination of actual taking to a later proceeding). 
168. Hage, 51 Fed. Cl. at 573; Hage, 35 Fed. Cl. at 153-55.
169. Hage, 51 Fed. Cl. at 573-74.
170. Id. at 574.
171. Id. at 577 (citations omitted).
172. Id. at 581.
173. Id. at 592.
174. Id.
175. According to a Lexis search, Hage v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 147 (Ct. Fed.
Cl. 1996) has been cited 90 times, Hage v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 249 (Ct. Fed. Cl 
1998) has been cited 18 times, and Hage, 51 Fed. Cl. 570 has been cited 32 times. 
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courts do their jobs.  However, with its straightforward rationale and 
succinct treatment of the issues in Colvin Cattle,176 the Federal Circuit obviates 
the Hage court's attempts to insert unnecessary complexity177 into an issue 
the Federal Circuit believes was thoroughly settled long ago.178 
Indeed, it is almost inconceivable to imagine that Colvin Cattle will not 
finally settle the Hage cases once and for all.  Colvin Cattle rejects almost every 
substantive legal theory advanced by the Plaintiff in Hage: (1) that federal 
regulation of grazing effectuates a taking; (2) that Plaintiff should be 
compensated under 43 U.S.C. § 1752(g)(2003); (3) that water rights in a ditch 
include the right to graze cattle along the ditch right of way; (4) that reduction 
in flows due to federal land management practices effectuated a taking of 
Plaintiff's property; and (5) that by cooperating with Nevada officials in elk 
reintroduction efforts the federal government effectuated a taking of Plaintiff's 
private property.179  The Hage court is bound by the decision in Colvin Cattle 
which states that "[grazing on federal public lands] . . . was, and remains, a 
privilege, not a right."180  The delay on the part of Judge Loren Smith in issuing 
a final ruling, sixteen years after the litigation was filed and a year after the 
holding in Colvin Cattle, is inexplicable. 
B. Colvin Cattle Persuades the New Mexico
Supreme Court in Walker
Walker181 is one of the cases spawned by the original Hage opinion, and 
is very similar to both Colvin Cattle and Hage, though importantly the 
litigation is set in New Mexico rather than Nevada.182  The Court of Federal 
176. See note 111, supra.
177. The last Hage decision, issued in 2002, comes in at around 92 pages.
Hage, 51 Fed. Cl. 570. 
178. Federal law recognizes state water rights, but without express
congressional authorization there can be no appurtenant right to graze.  Colvin Cattle 
Co. v. United States, 468 F.3d, 803 808 (2006) (citing Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 
539-40 (1976)).
179. See Supplemental Memorandum of Amici Curiae Nevada Department of
Wildlife Et Al., Regarding the Federal Circuit’s Decision in Colvin Cattle Co. v. United States 
(Fed. Cl. No. 91-1470L), available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi/current_ 
research/documents/RT_Briefs_PostColvinSupp.pdf. 
180. Colvin Cattle, 468 F.3d at 807 (citing Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 352
(1918)). 
181. Walker v. United States, 69 Fed. Cl. 222 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 2005) (certified to the
New Mexico Supreme Court), see note 114, supra. 
182. Walker, 69 Fed. Cl. at 223-24.
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Claims in Walker, faced with essentially the same issues at bar in Colvin 
Cattle,183 but without the relative clarity of Nevada law,184 found itself 
decidedly unsure of the proper interpretation of state property law as it 
applied to water and forage rights, and so certified these questions to the 
New Mexico Supreme Court.185 
The New Mexico Supreme Court found that no state property right 
existed on which to base a federal takings claim.186  The court reinforced its 
opinion with a discussion of water rights in the Western U.S., stating that 
such rights are separate property rights which can be severed from the land 
which gave rise to them.187  Such rights can also be acquired independently 
of the land,188 and that therefore the water right does not imply an ongoing 
right to continue the use of the federal land in the manner that gave rise to 
the right originally.  This general structure is known as the "prior 
appropriations doctrine." 
The Walker decision discusses the historical pressures which resulted 
in the domination of Western water law by the prior appropriation 
doctrine.189  Of relevance to our treatment of Colvin Cattle is the theory that 
prior appropriation developed because the traditional Eastern riparian 
doctrine's insistence on proof that reasonable use did not affect 
downstream users was impractical for Western users who often had to divert 
water for many miles in order to put it to beneficial use.190  This explains why 
water in the West is considered a separate property right: "all water rights, 
even if appurtenant to a certain piece of land, can be severed from that land 
and applied to another use at a different location."191  Under New Mexico 
183. Id. at 225.
184. Colvin Cattle, 468 F.3d at 807-808.
185. See note 114, supra.  In a subsequent proceeding, the Court of Federal
Claims in Walker further explained its justification for certification, washing its hands 
of the case until the New Mexico Supreme Court comes to a decision.  Walker v. United 
States, 72 Fed. Cl. 186 (2006) (decision denying defendant’s requests for summary 
judgment and finding no error in earlier certification decision).  The certification 
proceeding has been argued and briefed before the New Mexico Supreme Court, 
and a final decision, and a final decision issued.  Walker v. United States, 162 P.3d 
882 (N.M. 2007). 
186. Id. at 896.
187. Id. at 889.  These rights are termed “riparian rights.”  Id.
188. Id.  These rights are termed “appropriative rights.”  Id.
189. Id. at 888-890.
190. Id. at 889.
191. Id. at 891 (citations omitted).  The Walker court concluded that, as far as
New Mexico law was concerned, 
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law, such rights can be used to exclude others from use of the water, but 
cannot be used to establish a separate interest in the public domain.192  This 
certainly settles the federal case, as far as the New Mexico Supreme Court is 
concerned — without any vested state property right, the Walkers have no 
Fifth Amendment Takings claim against the federal government. 
Under Colvin Cattle, the Federal Circuit Court in Walker erred in certifying 
its questions to the New Mexico Supreme Court in the first place.  As noted 
earlier, there remains a certain level of ambiguity in the Colvin Cattle decision 
as a result of the Federal Circuit's partial reliance on Nevada state law in 
that case.193  However, as discussed above, the federal law justification for 
Colvin Cattle stands on its own two feet, without any help from state law.194  It 
is a distinct possibility that if the court's opinion in Colvin Cattle been issued 
at the time the Federal Circuit Court in Walker issued its certification 
decision, no certification would have occurred.195 
Indeed, the New Mexico Supreme Court issued an opinion in June of 
2007 that could be read as critical of the Federal Circuit Court's decision to 
the requirement that water must be put to beneficial use does not 
give rise to an interminable right to continue that same beneficial 
use. For example, if one acquires a water right by beneficially 
using water in a milling operation, which operation is 
subsequently shut down due to environmental violations, the mill 
operator cannot claim a right to continue milling just to protect 
the water rights. In this case, the Walkers' ability to acquire and 
use their water right on the allotments was conditioned on the 
permission of the federal government to go on the land. The 
Walkers were thus responsible for maintaining their license to 
graze on the public land, and since they lost that license, they 
cannot now rely on a right to continue a particular beneficial use 
to maintain the water right that they were able to acquire by way 
of government permission in the first place. Because the Walkers 
chose not to comply with the government's permitting process, 
they took the risk of either forfeiting their water right through non-
use or being forced to transfer, lease, or sell that right.   
Id. at 892 (citations omitted). 
192. Id. at 891.
193. See V. Analysis of the Decision in Colvin Cattle, supra.
194. See V. A. Federal Law Can Stand Alone, supra.
195. Walker v. United States, 69 Fed. Cl. 222 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 2005), was certified on
October 31, 2005, and subsequently affirmed by Walker, 72 Fed. Cl. 186 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 
2006) on July 21, 2006.  Colvin Cattle, 468 F.3d 803 (Fed. Cir. 2006), was not decided 
until November 1, 2006. 
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certify.196  The highest court in New Mexico spent six of the fourteen pages it 
wrote in Walker addressing the underlying federal case and governing federal 
precedents.197  On the Hage series of cases, the New Mexico court further 
opines that, 
[w]hile not expressly overruling Hage, both Colvin opinions
held that Nevada law does not support a claim identical to
what the Walkers assert here and similar to what the
ranchers said in Hage. . . . Thus, it appears that all federal
authority on this matter is contrary to the position the
Walkers now ask this Court to endorse.  For these reasons,
we expressly decline to follow the rationale put forth in the
[Hage] opinion.198
As far as the New Mexico Supreme Court is concerned, Colvin is now 
settled law and the Hage aberration has been put to rest. 
VII. Conclusion
Given the likely disposition of both Hage and Walker under the Colvin 
Cattle court's analysis, it is clear that the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit is well on its way to putting the Hage series of cases to bed. 
Arguably, an already overwhelming body of federal law was stacked against 
possessory interests for those utilizing the public domain for grazing.  Now 
this body of federal law has been buttressed by treating Hage as an aberration. 
While this might finally spell an end to sixteen years of litigation for 
Wayne Hage, it cannot be satisfying for the ranchers whose livelihoods hang 
by the thread of federal regulation and revocable grazing permits.  Since the 
days when federal lands were a commons, open to anyone with the fortitude 
to drive a herd of cows out to pasture, conflict has surrounded the range 
resource.199  The Walker court characterized its plaintiffs as "attempting to 
wage a battle lost at the turn of the last century."200  Over a century's worth of 
legal battles seem unlikely to be resolved by another legal precedent when 
the socio-political forces driving the combatants remain unchanged.  A dead 
end at Colvin Cattle is not likely to discourage the small but determined 
faction of ranchers who continue to seek private property protections for 
their grazing privileges. 
196. Walker, 162 P.3d 882.
197. Id. at 882-88.
198. Id. at 888.
199. See, e.g., Donahue, supra note 4.
200. Walker, 162 P.3d at 895.
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VIII. Postscript
It seems a happy ending was not in store for the Colvin Company.  In 
August of 2007, William Colvin brought suit in Oregon against his brother, 
and fellow shareholder in the Colvin Company, Ben Colvin, and against his 
brother's wife, Juanita Colvin.201  As stated earlier, Ben Colvin decided to 
move most of his cattle from the 40 Bar Ranch because wild horses and 
burros were reducing the profitability of the herd.202  William Colvin knew 
about the transfer of the herd, but he did not know about Ben Colvin's 
refusal to pay federal grazing fees and the resulting conflict with BLM 
agents — indeed, Ben Colvin did not inform his brother, the president of 
Colvin, that he had lost the company's grazing permits.203 
Eventually, Ben Colvin was forced to sell the remainder of his cattle, 
which had been pastured in Washington State, in order to cover his 
mounting legal fees and living expenses.204  Because he had proceeded 
without the authorization or knowledge of his brother, William, the parties 
agreed that they had to split up the company and go their separate ways.205  
As with many such agreements, this one ended up in court with William 
Colvin seeking a declaratory judgment that Ben had acted without the 
authorization of the company and that as a result, all operating losses from 
the 40 Bar Ranch, all legal fees associated with the lawsuit, and all fees and 
trespass penalties associated with the grazing permit dispute should be 
charged against Ben personally.206 
In Colvin Cattle, we find brother fighting brother, a family in crisis, and a 
way of life fast fading into the sunset of the American West as a land of 
limitless resources and wide-open pastures.  The court in Colvin v. Colvin held 
that, 
[b]y withholding grazing fees (and ultimately losing the
Corporation's grazing rights) and selling the brood herd,
Ben essentially rendered the 40 Bar Ranch a defunct cattle
201. Colvin v. Colvin, Civil No. 05-409-AA, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57213, *1 (D. Or.
Aug. 1, 2007). 
202. Id. at *4-5.
203. Id. at *11-12.
204. Id. at *14-15.  As was also noted above, “the Court of Claims dismissed
Ben’s lawsuit, and on November 1, 2006, the dismissal was upheld by the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit. . . . Accordingly, the Corporation has no grazing rights 
on adjacent federal land and will not be compensated for the loss of such rights, 
rendering it impossible for the 40 Bar Ranch to maintain a viable cattle operation.” 
Id. at *16-17 (citation omitted). 
205. Id at *14-15.
206. Id. at *17-18.
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operation, contrary to the Corporation's purpose. Moreover, 
in appealing the BLM's decision and filing suit against the 
federal government, Ben incurred tremendous legal fees 
and placed the Corporation's assets at risk - decisions that 
are not within Ben's ordinary course of business in running 
the Nevada operation.207 
In an interesting bit of dicta, the court found that Ben Colvin's decision 
to fight the federal government was based on "the widespread belief of cattle 
ranchers in Nevada that public rangelands were not property of the United 
States and that the BLM had no regulatory authority over the Montezuma 
Allotment."208 
The court found that Ben Colvin was personally responsible for the 
loss of the Company's assets in Nevada.209  Explaining its rationale, the court 
says, 
it appears likely that Ben became caught up in the property 
rights agenda promoted by fellow ranchers and took a 
stand against the federal government and the BLM.  That 
was his choice, but it was not a reasonable choice under 
the circumstances or one that was in the best interests of 
the Corporation.  Accordingly, the financial consequences 
flowing from that choice must be borne by Ben personally.210 
It seems clear, at least to this court, that "grazing leases, permits, or 
preferences do not confer a compensable property right in the underlying 
land."211  Indeed, the court further characterizes the chance that a court would 
find that water rights conferred a right to graze cattle as "slim-to-none."212 
It seems that we are witnessing the end of a chapter in the continuing 
battle between federal land managers and local cattle ranchers.  Realizing 
that seizing cattle was ineffective, the Justice Department, as of August 31, 
2007, has filed criminal trespass charges against Ben Colvin and William 
207. Id. at *27-28. Additionally, the court went on to “find that Ben’s decision
to withhold payment of grazing fees — ultimately resulting in the loss of grazing 
rights on the Montezuma Allotment and the seizure of the Corporation cattle — went 
far beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment.”  Id. at *30. 
208. Id. at *33.
209. Id. at *40-41.
210. Id. at *35 (citation omitted).
211. Id. at *36.
212. Id. at *40.
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Hage.213  According to the prosecutor in charge of the government's case, 
trespass charges are the only avenue left to the government for enforcement 
because of a new state law which obstructs the issuance of cattle ownership 
certificates — without which certificates, cattle seized by the BLM cannot be 
resold at auction.214  Thus the battle continues on a different front, and 
another chapter opens in the courts. 
213. Sandra Chereb, Feds File Trespass Lawsuit Against Nevada Ranchers, JACKSON HOLE 
STAR TRIBUNE, September 2, 2007, available at http://www.jacksonholestartrib.com/articles/ 
2007/09/02/news/regional/c564fb1f971d271f87257348006c7a5f.txt; Mark Waite, Justice 
Department Sues Two Well-Known Sagebrush Rebels, PAHRUMP VALLEY TIMES, August 31, 2007, 
available at http://www.pahrumpvalleytimes.com/2007/Aug-31-Fri-2007/news/16393232. 
html. 
214. Chereb, supra note 213; 2005 Nev. Stat. 1238 (codified at Nev. Rev. Stat. §
565.125 (2007) (amending Nevada’s state brand ordinance to require a mandatory 
hearing before a state judge before any federal seizure of cattle).  Notable among 
those testifying in favor of strengthening the bill’s protection of private property are 
Ben Colvin, Helen Chenoweth-Hage, and Wayne Hage.  The minutes of the 
committee meeting show the deference paid to these Sagebrush luminaries.  Minutes 
of the Meeting of the Assembly Committee on Natural Resources, Agriculture, and Mining, 73rd 
Session (April 6, 2005), available at http://www.leg.state.nv.us/73rd/Minutes/Assembly/ 
NR/Final/3923.pdf. 
